Copyright Statement on Dec. 20, 2023
Original Concept/Copyright Statement
extreme disparity in power constitutes the fundamental force sustaining the order of power | by: Ye Qiquan | |
Content: Whether in global imperial orders or dynastic internal systems, the power differential constitutes the fundamental force sustaining the stable operation of power structures. Systems possessing vast power differentials can maintain prolonged periods of stable operation. Should this differential be diminished, the functioning of the orderly system becomes obstructed, transformed, or overthrown. The diminishing of power differentials invariably leads to chaos, where various secondary forces undergo constant reorganisation, weakening, extinction, and regeneration until a new power disparity emerges to establish a fresh system. The disparity gap between supreme and subordinate powers determines the scope of the supreme power's coverage. The greater the power differential, the broader the sphere of governance achievable. A relatively weak power differential can only cover a comparatively small domain. China's 3,000 years of recorded history vividly illustrate this process. A new leadership collective emerges from a period of chaos, establishing a vast power differential through that very turmoil. This immense power differential then establishes a stable dynastic order. During the dynasty's operation, the strength of the secondary power tier gradually increases. This leads to a narrowing of the power differential between the top and secondary tiers. The functioning of the imperial or dynastic order becomes impeded and chaotic. Chaos brings about a new cycle: ‘establishing a differential’ → ‘establishing order’ → ‘stable operation of order’ → ‘chaotic operation of order’ → establishing a new ‘power differential’. There are two fundamental reasons why European-system states (broadly encompassing the United States and other nations within the American-European institutional framework) cannot establish the foundations for extensive, comprehensive, and long-term stable national or imperial orders. Firstly, they have failed to discover methods for establishing vast power differentials. Secondly, the philosophical logic of the European system prevents them from discovering such methods. The underlying reason European-system states have long depended on warfare, perpetually relying on war to sustain their national existence, lies in the fact that ‘war has become the habitual pathway for the European-type power system to maintain its power differential.’ European-type states at the apex of power expand their tax bases through warfare to sustain or widen power differentials. European-type states at the base of power are economically weakened by warfare, widening the gap between their economic foundations and demands. This ‘false power differential’ maintains state order stability while laying the groundwork for subsequent economic expansion. References: Ye Qiquan. The Rise and Fall of Empires. Forthcoming. | ||
Europe's Characteristics of ‘Uncertain Prospects’ and ‘Tribal Non-Coexistence’ | by: Ye Qiquan | |
Content: European philosophical logic possesses two foundational characteristics: ‘uncertain prospects’ and ‘tribal non-coexistence’. This philosophical logic is rooted in Europe's protracted civilisational development and the evolutionary history of its states. References: Ye Qiquan. Europe's Uncertainty. Forthcoming. Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Plan (6): Europe's Anomaly. PPPNet. 29 March 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan6-eus-uncertainty/ | ||
Endogenous Roots of Europe's Catastrophes | by: Ye Qiquan | |
Content: Russia itself is not the fundamental cause of European security. The endogenous roots of Europe's catastrophe lie in its philosophical logic. These are ‘prospect uncertainty’ and ‘tribal incompatibility’. These two characteristics form the basis for European nations' widespread reliance on and enthusiasm for warfare. They also constitute the foundation for Europe's inability to establish a comprehensive power order and its difficulty in achieving national integration. Until the European philosophical logic, underpinned by “tribal incompatibility” and “uncertain prospects”, is rectified, no external solution can fundamentally resolve the issue of Europe being the root cause of global conflict. References: Ye Qiquan. Europe's Uncertainty. Forthcoming. Ye Qiquan. China's Plan for Military Unification (6): Europe's Anomaly. PPPNet. 29 March 2023. | ||
‘Path of Economic Contraction’ is Humanity's Inevitable Doom | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content: During periods when an economic system faces stagnant expansion, various attempts and experiments emerge. After these experiments fail, an economic trajectory that humanity strives to avoid yet finds fundamentally unavoidable inevitably materialises. This is the ‘path of economic contraction’. Its manifestation involves weakening, shrinking, and destroying the existing economic foundations and aggregate economic volume, thereby creating ‘false expansionary space’ for the next wave of ‘economic expansion’. China's documented history spanning over 3,000 years provides compelling empirical evidence for this theory. Following periods of chaos, ancient China's economic foundations and population often dwindled to one-tenth to one-third of pre-disruption levels. This ‘false expansionary space’ subsequently underpinned the next cycle of ‘great governance’ (economic expansion). This theoretical discovery suggests that humanity may find large-scale warfare difficult to avoid after discovering new paths for economic expansion. Discovering new pathways for economic development and new technological avenues are both effective methods for avoiding large-scale warfare. References: Ye Qiquan. The Essential Attributes of War. Forthcoming | ||
War is a genetic memory and a collective imperative | by: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
War memory constitutes a memory factor parasitising within the genes of creation. These memories are inherited across generations. They are also stimulated or suppressed under certain external pressures.
Plants distributed across multiple time zones worldwide can suddenly bloom and shed fruit simultaneously at a unified moment. Certain plants produce chemical or biological substances to inhibit the growth of other species. These all constitute acts of war by plants. Plants too require war actions to secure the right to species continuity.
Though individuals instinctively reject death, collective strategies constitute the warfare tactics of small-bodied animals. Genes employ group strategies, sacrificing a minority of individuals to ensure species survival.
Even apex predators require organisational capacity or collective strategies to guarantee their lineage's continuity.
Super-predators may, driven by genetic memory, relinquish individual reproductive rights or food dominance to secure survival under adverse conditions.
References:
Ye Qiquan. The Essential Attributes of Warfare. Forthcoming
Ye Qiquan. National Warfare Intensity Model: Predicting the Course of the Ukraine Conflict. PPPNet. 7 December 2023. http://pppnet.net/nation-war-strength-model-and-prediction/
Organisational capacity constitutes a vital component of war memory | by Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
Organisational capability constitutes a collective necessity.
It also represents a critical warfare capacity. Organisational capability is the fundamental capacity determining species continuity.
Organisational capability constitutes a genetic memory.
Species possessing super-individual survival capabilities may also exhibit super-organisational capabilities under specific conditions. Only the force of inherited war memory can achieve the objective of compelling super-predators to relinquish reproductive rights and food dominance in favour of forming formidable groups.
Organisational capacity can be stimulated, enhanced, or diminished by the environment.
The famed “Bad Boys” lion pride in Africa demonstrated extraordinary warfare capabilities through its superlative organisational prowess. Upon confirming the absence of existential threats, this pride fragmented. Later, when both splinter groups faced survival crises, the smaller factions reunited to bolster their warfare and survival capabilities.
Organisational capacity is also influenced by survival models (or philosophical paradigms).
The Great Irish Famine stands as the primary root cause of contemporary Anglo-Irish tensions. By comparison, ancient China experienced multiple scenarios akin to the Irish famine. Yet each such catastrophe became a pivotal opportunity for ancient Chinese communities to integrate and unite. At critical junctures, dominant core groups adopted divergent survival philosophies and pathways, thereby forging distinct organisational capabilities.
References:
Ye Qiquan. The Essential Attributes of War. Forthcoming
Ye Qiquan. National War Intensity Model: Predicting the Course of the Ukraine Conflict. PPPNet. 7 December 2023. http://pppnet.net/nation-war-strength-model-and-prediction/
Territorial expanse and geographical configuration constitute the most vital assets for warfare and strategic deterrence capabilities | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content: The deployment of high-yield, wide-area weapons is increasingly becoming a military reality. (1) Nations worldwide are investing substantial resources into high-yield bomb research. Among conventional armaments, weapons exceeding 1,000 tonnes of TNT equivalent are nearing operational readiness; The deployment of high-yield conventional munitions is increasingly becoming a military reality; (2. Thirty-five years after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, global apprehension regarding nuclear contamination has progressively diminished. This reality has reduced the moral constraints on employing military nuclear devices; (3) Following the Fukushima nuclear leak in Japan, the international community has shown considerable tolerance towards the discharge of radioactive contaminants. This has further lowered the moral threshold for employing low-yield, or even medium-yield, nuclear weapons; (4) The miniaturisation and practical application of low-radiation nuclear weapons have heightened the likelihood of nuclear devices being employed in total war; The model of total war waged by nations or groups of nations has re-emerged as a political reality. This development amplifies the impact of vast territories and complex terrain on the conduct of warfare and has become the most potent strategic deterrent for ensuring national survival in the prospect of nuclear conflict. References: Ye Qi-quan. The Essential Attributes of War. Forthcoming Ye Qi-quan. The State War Intensity Model: Predicting the Course of the Ukraine Conflict. PPPNet. 7 December 2023. http://pppnet.net/nation-war-strength-model-and-prediction/ | ||
‘Effective Range’ of Weapons | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
The effective range of weapons is jointly determined by three factors: operational distance (lethal range); lethal effect (destructive impact); and economic efficiency (capacity for large-scale deployment).
References:
Ye Qi-quan. The Essential Attributes of War. Forthcoming
Ye Qi-quan. China's Military Unification Strategy (2): Variables Facing China and the US. PPPNet. 29 March 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables/
Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Strategy (1): Formulated in 2012, Implemented in 2026 (Part One). PPPNet. 29 March 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026/
History of Warfare is Essentially the History of Progress in Effective Range | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
The spear replaced the club because it extended the lethal range while delivering comparable destructive effects. Projectile weapons (bows, crossbows, catapults) constituted the first revolutionary generation of long-range armaments. They first enabled the killing of enemies without physical contact. Matchlocks, percussion rifles, artillery, heavy machine guns, modern artillery, self-propelled guns, naval guns, combined-range weapons, modern long-range missiles, and so forth—all have pursued the singular objective of extending lethal reach.
References:
Ye Qiquan. The Essential Attributes of War. Forthcoming
Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Strategy (2): Variables Facing China and the US. PPPNet. 29 March 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables/
Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Strategy (1): Formulated in 2012, Implemented in 2026 (Part One). PPPNet. 29 March 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026/
Economy is the most crucial attribute of a war's ‘decisive weapon’ | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content: Economy (i.e., the capacity for large-scale deployment) constitutes the most vital characteristic of effective range and the paramount attribute of a war's ‘decisive weapon’. Yet for over a millennium after entering the battlefield, the bow failed to attain the status of a dominant weapon. This was precisely because its economy proved unsustainable. Upon its emergence, the matchlock swiftly supplanted the bow despite having inferior range and being weather-dependent. This was because its manufacturing cost was comparable to the bow, while its training, maintenance, and operational costs were significantly lower. The replacement of the matchlock by the flintlock stemmed fundamentally from increased range and lethality. The associated cost increase was acceptable, as the overall lethality-to-cost ratio improved. Neither the heavy machine gun, Germany's colossal heavy artillery, nor the V1 and V2 rockets achieved a decisive firepower advantage. Economic cost was the fundamental reason. Europe's most advanced tank, the Tiger, which led in comprehensive firepower metrics, ultimately succumbed to the T-34 and Sherman tanks, which were vastly inferior in both firepower and protection. Economic efficiency (i.e., economies of scale) was the fundamental reason. Long-range missiles cannot be applied in conventional warfare. Even if deployed in such conflicts, they cannot produce significant strategic effects. The root cause lies in their unsustainable economic viability. References: Ye Qiquan. The Essential Attributes of War. Forthcoming Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Strategy (2): Variables Facing China and the US. PPPNet. 29 March 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables/ Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Strategy (1): Formulated in 2012, Implemented in 2026 (Part One). PPPNet. 29 March 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026/ | ||
Aircraft Carriers Decline from the Centre Stage of Warfare | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content: Economic efficiency (i.e., the capacity for large-scale deployment) constitutes the most crucial characteristic of effective range and the paramount attribute of a ‘decisive weapon’ in warfare. Should any weapon emerge with comprehensive economic performance surpassing that of an aircraft carrier strike group, the costly aircraft carrier approach will gradually (or rapidly) withdraw from the historical stage where it once dominated the outcome of wars. China's strategic-level weapons are deemed to have surpassed US carrier-based armaments in both ‘economic efficiency’ and ‘lethal range’. Another critical metric, ‘destructive effect,’ awaits verification. Should China's land-based strategic weapons ultimately demonstrate superior comprehensive ‘effective range’ to America's carrier-based systems, the gradual diminishing importance of sea-based weapons would constitute a reasonable expectation and hypothesis. References: Ye Qi-quan. The Essential Attributes of War. Forthcoming Ye Qi-quan. China's Military Unification Strategy (2): Variables Facing China and the US. PPPNet. 29 March. 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables/ Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Strategy (1): Formulated in 2012, Implemented in 2026 (Part One) . PPPNet. 29 March 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026/ | ||
The Decline of Maritime Power | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
Should the United States deploy aircraft carrier strike groups as its dominant weapon, China's medium-range missiles would correspondingly enter the battlefield. This is dictated by the principle of reciprocal response in warfare. Political manoeuvring may delay or slightly postpone this countermeasure, but it cannot prevent the process from unfolding. This constitutes one of the fundamental attributes of warfare.
Land-based weaponry has endured four centuries of relative weakness. Should its comprehensive ‘effective range’ advantage be validated by a single conflict, the maritime power parasitising upon ‘sea power weaponry superiority’ will inevitably commence its historical decline.
China's land-based weaponry is demonstrating its latent capabilities. Moreover, they await a conflict.
The ‘effective range’ advantage of land-based weaponry possesses a considerable probability of being validated.
References:
Ye Qiquan. The Essential Attributes of War. Forthcoming.
Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Strategy (2): Variables Facing China and the US. PPPNet. 29 March 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables/
Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Strategy (1): Formulated in 2012, Implemented in 2026 (Part One). PPPNet. 29 March 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026/
Nation's Economic and Productive Capacity Determines the Outcome of War | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
The capabilities of the primary and secondary industries form the foundation underpinning a nation's war-making capacity. This capability manifests in a nation's ability to sustain its war effort when excluded from a financial exchange system.
Industrial capacity constitutes not only a nation's ability to initiate warfare, but also its capacity to endure the blows of war. It further serves as the foundation for victory in protracted attrition warfare.
References:
Ye Qiquan. The Essential Attributes of War. Forthcoming
Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Strategy (2): Variables Facing China and the US. PPPNet. 29 March 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables/
Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Strategy (1): Formulated in 2012, Implemented in 2026
(Part One). PPPNet. 29 March 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026/
“陆剑”或“陆桥”侵蚀海权 | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
" The ‘Land Sword’ or ‘Land Bridge’ is not a geographical concept. Rather, it is a geopolitical concept. It specifically refers to peninsulas or offshore islands protruding into waters or seas that possess robust land-based functionalities. Protected by solid land-based forces, they are difficult for sea-based forces to destroy. Simultaneously, their projection into maritime areas extends the strike capabilities of land-based forces, thereby enhancing the suppression of maritime power by land power.
References:
Ye Qiquan. The Essential Attributes of War. Coming soon
Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Strategy (2): Variables Facing China and the US. PPPNet. 29 March 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables/
Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Strategy (1): Formulated in 2012, Implemented in 2026 (Part One). PPPNet. 29 March 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026/
2022 European War | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
From 2023 onwards, Ye Qiquan will refer to the conflict that commenced on 24 February 2022 on Ukrainian soil as the ‘2022 European War’. This term designates the conflict widely termed the ‘Ukraine War’ or ‘Russia-Ukraine War’. This designation is warranted as the conflict fully embodies ‘European characteristics’ .
Nearly all European nations are involved, employing diverse methods and means.
Nearly all European nations are affected. The economic strength, economic prospects, political power, political outlook, and capacity to respond to future crises of all European nations have been negatively impacted by this war.
Europe as a whole now faces a new threat: the process of ‘border shifting’ among European nations is poised to commence at any moment. Or perhaps it has already begun.
References:
Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Plan (2): Variables Facing China and the US. PPPNet. 29 March 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables/
Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Plan (1): Formulated in 2012, Implemented in 2026 (Part One) . PPPNet. 29 March 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026/
The 2022 European War Cannot Conclude Before 2026 | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
America's strategic objectives remain unfulfilled
War and chaos have become America's pursuit.
Maintaining global order through maritime supremacy constitutes an exorbitantly costly governance model. When America loses its capacity to peacefully ‘increase its tax base,’ it inevitably resorts to war and chaos to sustain the ‘power differential’ required for administrative order.
Poland, Romania, and Hungary have yet to secure strategic gains
Weakening Russia, enhancing regional political influence, and reaping geopolitical dividends should constitute Poland's three primary political objectives. Beyond a temporary boost to its regional political standing, Poland has thus far gained no other political benefits.
Romania and Hungary have explicitly articulated their political and geopolitical ambitions. Prolonging the 2022 European war and intensifying chaos in Western Ukraine represent a rational means for Poland, Romania, and Hungary to secure political dividends.
The Baltic states desire the war's continuation
Should Russia's state power not suffer significant weakening, the Baltic states would face even greater political pressure than presently. These nations currently dare not take centre stage in opposing Russia. Yet, behind the scenes, prolonging the war will constitute their paramount political objective.
Russia Abandons Political Hesitation
It is evident that Russia has discarded the political hesitation evident in the war's early stages. They now employ pragmatic means to pursue their national interests.
China Anticipates the European War's Continuation
China has essentially confirmed that Europe will constitute a future political burden for the nation. Preventing Europe from becoming America's war machine has become China's new state policy. Weakening Europe serves this objective.
Numerous Nations Prepare to Join the Turmoil
Numerous nations have completed their political and ideological preparations. They stand ready to join any turmoil that advances their national interests.
References:
Ye Qi-quan. Europe's Uncertainty. Forthcoming
Ye Qi-quan. 2026 Unification of Taiwan: Impact, Consequences, and Risks. Chapter Seven (European Uncertainty).
China's New European Policy (Already Initiated) | by: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
In the copyright notice page of the 18 February 2023 edition, Ye Qiquan predicted a fundamental shift in China's European policy.
Remarks by Lu Shaye, Chinese Ambassador to France, on 23 April 2023, authentically reflect a reality. Namely, China has genuinely altered its fundamental policy towards Europe. Although China's higher-level officials have denied that Lu's remarks represent China's official stance.
Prior to 2019, China was a stronger advocate for a robust Europe than European nations themselves. China anticipated Europe would serve as a political pressure valve to alleviate pressure from the United States.
The outbreak of the 2022 European War signalled that Europe possesses entirely colonial attributes. Europe cannot fulfil China's expectation of serving as a political pressure valve. Instead, as an American colony, Europe will become a political liability for China should Sino-American conflict arise.
Consequently, weakening Europe has become a fundamental Chinese policy. Diminishing Europe is essential to eroding America's capacity for protracted attrition warfare. Instigating European instability offers a reliable pathway to undermining America's overall political dominance. Europe and Israel constitute the twin military and political pillars sustaining American imperial power. Weakening Europe and provoking European chaos simultaneously undermines both pillars of the American imperial order.
References:
Ye Qi-quan. Europe's Uncertainty. Forthcoming
Ye Qi-quan. Whose War? Winners and Losers in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict. PPPNet. 11 February 2023. http://pppnet.net/players-winning-or-losing-from-russia-ukraine-war-2/
Europe on the Eve of Great Turmoil (High Risk) | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
The 2022 European War has weakened Europe's political power
The 2026 Asian War will spill over into Europe
Europe's ‘border fluidity’ process has been initiated;
NATO's collective defence mechanism has been breached;
Europe's authority to formulate economic rules has been diminished;
Europe's capacity to initiate conceptual warfare has been significantly weakened;
Europe's established power structures face the risk of deconstruction.
Emergence of new geopolitical powers; Geopolitical forces undergo restructuring or realignment;
References:
Ye Qi-quan. Europe's Uncertainty. Forthcoming
Ye Qiquan. Whose War? Winners and Losers in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict. PPPNet. 11 February 2023. http://pppnet.net/players-winning-or-losing-from-russia-ukraine-war-2/
Ye Qiquan. Chapter Seven: Europe's Uncertainty. 2026 Taiwan Unification: Impacts, Consequences, and Risks.
Europe Faces Dilemma of Joining or Avoiding the 2026 Asian War | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
As a de facto colony of the United States, Europe finds it difficult to avoid joining US-initiated military operations against China.
Europe harbours a profoundly ‘endogenous’ hostility towards China. It stands ready to participate in any action aimed at ‘completely defeating China.’
China holds substantial political leverage over Europe. China could readily initiate a formal ‘European border drift’ process.
China possesses the capacity to trigger, accelerate, and intensify chaos within Europe's core regions at any moment.
The preservation or dismantling of Europe's power structure hinges primarily on the intricate tripartite dynamics between China, the US, and Europe. This manifests chiefly in the following dimensions:
- Whether Europe as a bloc directly intervenes in Sino-American military conflict;
- Whether the US resolves to exclude China from the existing power architecture;
- Whether China ultimately decides to sever ties with the United States entirely;
References:
Ye Qiquan. Europe's Uncertainty. Forthcoming
Ye Qiquan. Whose War? Winners and Losers in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict. PPPNet. 11 February 2023.
http://pppnet.net/players-winning-or-losing-from-russia-ukraine-war-2/
Ye Qiquan. Chapter Seven: Europe's Uncertainty. 2026 Taiwan Unification: Impacts, Consequences, and Risks.
A 2026 Asian War is Highly Probable | by: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
Following China's initiation of actions to unify Taiwan, the United States will be compelled to launch countermeasures against China. This constitutes an essential requirement for preserving the US-dominated imperial order.
The US cannot activate pre-emptive peace negotiations to neutralise the anti-systemic nature of China's unification campaign.
Countermeasures lacking military action would struggle to appease collective Western public sentiment.
Military action possesses inherent characteristics. These attributes may evade politicians' control, escalating the war response level incrementally until reaching full-scale conflict or even nuclear warfare.
Numerous nations have completed preparations. They stand ready to join the fray.
Other third parties are unwilling to stand idly by as Sino-American power dynamics shift.
References:
Ye Qi-quan. China's Military Unification Plan (2): Variables on Both Sides. PPPNet. 8 September 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables-02/
Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Plan (4): US Options. PPPNet. 9 September 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan4-usas-options-04/
Pre-emptive Negotiations Best Serve US Interests Yet Prove Most Difficult to Implement | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
Regarding China's actions to reunify Taiwan, the United States possesses the option of pre-emptive negotiations. Such negotiations can facilitate comprehensive, multi-dimensional exchanges. Exchange interests one can relinquish for those one cannot abandon, and use disposable assets to appease the other party's non-negotiable interests. This maximises national gains while avoiding the immense risks of military confrontation.
However, given the collective Western public sentiment's intense hostility towards China, any pre-emptive negotiation proposal risks ending a politician's career. Presently, no powerful politician appears capable of reversing the prevailing atmosphere of ‘political correctness’.
The solution most aligned with national interests invariably secures the opportunity for implementation.
References:
Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Plan (1): Formulated in 2012, Implemented in 2026. PPPNet. 7 September 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026-1cn/
Ye Qi-quan. China's Military Unification Plan (4): American Options. PPPNet. 9 September 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan4-usas-options-04/
United States' Campaign Warfare Costs Exceed China's | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
The input-output efficiency of land-based airfields combined with short-range missiles far surpasses that of mobile airfields (aircraft carriers) paired with short-range missiles.
Even if China refrains from destroying America's mobile airfields, the F-35's range and payload capacity remain inferior to China's J-20.
Assuming America's air-launched missiles match China's range, China could still prevail through prolonged economic attrition by leveraging cheaper land-based airfields and missile costs.
Indeed, America holds the weaker position in all three of these hypothetical scenarios [10].
References:
Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Plan (1): Formulated in 2012, Implemented in 2026. PPPNet. 7 September 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026-1cn/
Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Plan (2): Variables on Both Sides of the Sino-American Equation. PPPNet. 8 September 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables-02/
Ye Qi-quan. China's Military Unification Plan (5): Scenario Assumptions for Sino-US Total War. PPPNet. 10 September 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan5-imagined-conflict-scenario-05/
Strategic War Cost for the US Exceeds That of China | Author: Ye Qi-quan | |
Content: Based on current online cost estimates, approximately 400-600 Chinese medium-range missiles would equal the cost of one US Ford-class aircraft carrier; 900-1100 missiles would approximate the cost of an entire US carrier strike group. Even halving this baseline estimate—where 200 Chinese medium-range missiles equal one US carrier and 450 equal one strike group— it is plausible that such quantities could neutralise the combat effectiveness of a single American carrier. This demonstrates that the United States similarly faces cost disadvantages in deploying strategic weapons. Current online consensus posits that the range of Chinese-produced medium-range missiles exceeds that of a US aircraft carrier combined with the operational range of F-35s and air-launched cruise missiles. Simultaneously, online estimates suggest China maintains a stockpile of approximately 3,000 medium-range missiles. It is certain that should Sino-US conflict materialise, China's production rate for medium-range missiles would surpass America's aircraft carrier construction pace. References: Ye Qiquan. China's Plan for a Military Unification (1): Formulated in 2012, Implemented in 2026. PPPNet. 7 September 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026-1cn/ Ye Qi-quan. China's Military Unification Plan (2): Variables on Both Sides. PPPNet. 8 September 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables-02/ Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Plan (5): Scenario Assumptions for Sino-US Total War. PPPNet. 10 September 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan5-imagined-conflict-scenario-05/ | ||
Sino-US Total War Escalates Nuclear War Risk | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content: Overall, the probability of nuclear war erupting remains extremely low. However, comprehensive total war elevates the likelihood of nuclear conflict. The United States cannot defeat China in conventional warfare—a highly probable assumption. This high-probability scenario simultaneously traps both China and the United States in a dilemma over the application of nuclear devices. The deployment of nuclear devices becomes an unavoidable option during the escalation of group warfare between China and the United States. The American bloc possesses a psychological advantage in initiating higher war response levels. Western public opinion harbours an impulse to utterly defeat China. Western public sentiment and underlying logic do not align with their ‘anti-nuclear conceptual warfare’ propaganda. Once Western public support for ‘nuclear device deployment’ is mobilised, Western politicians lack the capacity to halt it. The primary responsibility for preventing the initiation of nuclear war rests upon China's shoulders. References: Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Plan (2): Variables on Both Sides of the Sino-American Relationship. PPPNet. 8 September 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables-02/ Ye Qi-quan. Alliance War Intensity Assessment System: Projecting Outcomes of Full-Scale Sino-American Conflict in East Asia. PPPNet. 9 December 2023. http://pppnet.net/group-war-strength-system-predicting-china-usa-war-around-east-asia/ Ye Qi-quan. National War Intensity Model, with Predictions on the Course of the Ukraine War. PPPNet. 7 December 2023. http://pppnet.net/nation-war-strength-model-and-prediction/ | ||
Technical and Substantive Approaches to Deterring Nuclear War | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
(1. Tactical Deterrence
- Tactical deterrence against nuclear war refers to the capacity of politicians from both China and the United States to leverage their influence over political and military situations, thereby preventing the outbreak of nuclear war at the decision-making level.
- Politicians from both China and the United States must maintain complete control over the entire war process, ensuring that the political capabilities of frontline commanders are aligned with their military capabilities. Simultaneously, both China and the United States must avoid inflicting significant military blows upon each other. For instance, neither side should sink the other's aircraft carriers, nor should either side cause casualties exceeding 5,000 in a single campaign.
- Risks. The ultimate authority over national policy decisions for the United States and its allies resides with the electorate. The final decision to prevent or initiate nuclear war rests with the electorate. As the war response level escalates, the decision to de-escalate or further escalate the conflict cannot be effectively controlled by politicians.
(2. Substantive Deterrence
- Substantive deterrence against the nuclear war option refers to preventing the nuclear option based on public opinion.
- Given the inability of Western politicians to prevent their electorates from authorising nuclear use, the primary responsibility for preventing nuclear war inevitably shifts to China.
- To substantively deter nuclear options, China must, prior to initiating military action against Taiwan, substantially leak or disclose that it possesses over 3,500 nuclear warheads. This would compel the United States and its allies to block nuclear options at the level of public opinion.
References:
Ye Qi-quan. China's Military Unification Plan (2): Variables on Both Sides of the Sino-American Equation. PPPNet. 8 September 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-2-high-weight-variables-02/
Ye Qi-quan. China's Military Unification Plan (5): Scenario Assumptions for Sino-American Total War. PPPNet. 10 September 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan5-imagined-conflict-scenario-05/
US Post-Event Defence Scenarios (Classification) | by: Ye Qi-quan | |
Content:
Absorption-Type Defence Strategy:
The absorption-type defence strategy encompasses either a ‘pre-conflict negotiation plan’ or a ‘post-conflict negotiation plan’. Its fundamental premise involves obscuring, downplaying, or even denying the anti-systemic nature of China's unification actions. It entails ceding partial political and economic authority to mitigate (or even negate) the shockwaves of China's actions against the imperial order. Unless a super-political figure suddenly emerges, such strategies exist only in theory. However, this approach would provide a rehearsal pathway for the subsequent pacification military plan and lay groundwork for ultimately achieving peace negotiations.
Coexistence-Oriented Defence Strategy:
The coexistence-oriented defence strategy primarily employs the ‘pacification military plan’ to confine military conflict to a low-intensity level. Simultaneously, it uses low-intensity military conflict to guide domestic public opinion in the United States and Europe. This aims to eventually lead public opinion to acknowledge the reality that China cannot be defeated through military means. Comprehensive negotiations for coexistence would then proceed upon this shared understanding.
Offensive Defence Strategy
The Offensive Defence Strategy comprises a set of approaches primarily employing military intervention to achieve political objectives. The inherent characteristics of China and the United States as superpowers dictate that a full-scale military conflict would primarily focus on destroying or debilitating the adversary's sustained war-making capabilities. This unique attribute necessitates that the theatre of war inevitably expands, spreads, and penetrates into core European regions, the Middle East, North Africa, Australia, and even South America. This possibility can be bluntly described as triggering a global war.
Split-Defence Strategy
Perhaps this set of action plans does not exist. Perhaps it is merely an evolutionary outcome of either the Offensive Strategy or the Coexistence Strategy. Its defining feature is that neither the Chinese bloc nor the American bloc can defeat the other, nor are they willing to compromise. It may also stem from mutual apprehension between China and the United States regarding compromise. The outcome of the Divisive Defence Strategy would be the fragmentation of the global economic system into two parallel frameworks: a Western system centred on the United States, North America, and the core of Europe; and an Eastern system anchored by China, Japan, and Russia. Other nations would oscillate between these two blocs. However, this approach would foster enduring chaos. Political and economic disorder would coexist, rendering this arrangement unsustainable.
References:
Ye Qi-quan. China's Military Unification Plan (6): Europe's Anomaly. PPPNet. 10 September 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan6-eus-uncertainty-06/
L1 Line Emerges as New Target for Russian National Security | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
The Ukrainian trenches will politically, economically, and culturally isolate Russia from Europe for at least 50 years.
Expelling Russia from Europe and stripping Russians of their European identity have become the West's new objectives.
The anti-Russian campaign has comprehensively triggered a philosophical and ideological crisis among Russians.
Russia shall endure the lingering pain of ‘post-imperial fragmentation’.
Interactions between the Russian, Belarusian, and Russian ethnic groups face complex and unpredictable trajectories.
The L1 Line is now perceived by Russians as an essential barrier safeguarding national survival.
Over a 100- to 200-year timeframe, the possibility of Russians relocating towards this geopolitical boundary appears highly plausible.
Emerging turmoil in other global regions may accelerate this process.
References:
Ye Qi-quan. Uncertainty in Europe. Forthcoming.
Ye Qi-quan. China's Plan for Military Unification (1): Formulated in 2012, Implemented in 2026. PPPNet. 7 September 2023.
http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-1-shaped-by-2012-works-in-2026-1cn/
Ye Qiquan. Predicting the Boundary Wall in the Russia-Ukraine War as Early as 26 April 2022. PPPNET. 2023. http://pppnet.net/early-prophecy-on-confined-walls-in-russia-ukraine-war/ Ye Qi-quan. Three Theoretical Ceasefire Lines in the Russia-Ukraine War. PPPNET. 2023. http://pppnet.net/three-possible-ceasefire-lines-in-russia-ukraine-war/
China's ‘Recognition Faction’ and ‘Action Faction’ | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
China's recognition faction possesses a clear-eyed understanding of the hostility from the US-Western alliance. They consciously deny or obscure this process of political antagonism, seeking to delay full-scale confrontation with the US alliance while maximising China's national interests throughout.
China's Action-Oriented Faction may not yet fundamentally grasp that the persistent hostile actions of the United States (and its alliance) constitute the primary political trajectory of the West. They may perceive the ‘political conflicts’ between China and the US as fluctuations and deviations occurring along a timeline. They believe (or imagine) that through their diligent efforts, these fluctuations and deviations can be corrected or mitigated. This perception drives them to work even harder to mend relations between China and the various nations within the US alliance.
References:
Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Plan (3): Foundations of Variable Design. PPPNET. 9 September 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan-3-chinas-design-bk-03/
Ye Qiquan. Chapter Two: Design Context of China's Unification Plan and Internal Flaws of the United States. 2026 Unification of Taiwan: Impact, Consequences, and Risks.
Characteristics of China's 2026 Taiwan Unification Operation | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
No discernible political hesitation
Deployment of at least four times the actual required troop strength;
Prioritisation of political objectives;
Rapid and comprehensive military advance;
Slow and protracted political process;
Inducing a gradual yet substantial reaction from the American bloc;
Triggering over three years of comprehensive soft confrontation between East and West;
Implementing major political initiatives in Europe, North Africa, and the Arab world.
Avoid hastily establishing a non-military-supervised political structure in Taiwan.
References:
Ye Qi-quan. China's Military Unification Plan (9): (3: Pathways and Characteristics of Unification). PPPNet. 17 September 2023.
Ye Qi-quan's Assessment of South Korea | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
South Korea is an inevitable participant and key member in the early, low-level stages of Sino-American military conflict.
It is South Korea's political capability that prevents it from engaging in full-scale war with China, Russia, or even North Korea.
South Korea cannot engage in medium-level or higher-level warfare operations.
The assumption of South Korea's swift withdrawal from the war process is foreseeable.
References:
Ye Qi-quan. China's Military Unification Plan (8): South Korea's Difficult Path. PPPNet. 11 September 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan8-s-koreas-thorn-08/
Ye Qiquan's Evaluation of Japan | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
The hypothetical probability of Japan's involvement in a Sino-American military conflict approaches infinity. Japan possesses a strong impulse and imperative to achieve a decisive victory over China.
Should China gain the initiative on the Asian battlefield, or should the Sino-American conflict escalate to a medium-level conflict, Japan and its allies will inevitably redeploy effective military forces to other garrison points to evade the effective range of China's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
The opportunity for Japan to independently determine its foreign policy will also arise with the withdrawal of US military forces from East Asia. Should the United States demonstrate an inability to prevail over China in conflicts of medium intensity or higher, Japan would swiftly abandon the American alliance to join China's sphere of influence.
Upon confirming an inability to defeat China, Japan would seize this historical juncture to alleviate its historical liabilities rather than continue accumulating further historical costs.
Japan lacks the capacity to confront China's political pressures unilaterally. Once China's geopolitical ascendancy is confirmed, reducing Japan's historical burdens and mitigating its present geopolitical pressures become inevitable choices.
Should Japan decide to withdraw from the US alliance, the probability of it taking further political and military steps is exceptionally high.
References:
Ye Qiquan. China's Military Unification Plan (7): Japan's Dilemma. PPPNet. 10 September 2023. http://pppnet.net/chinas-unifying-plan7-japans-struggle-07/
Ye Qi-quan's Commentary on India | Author: Ye Quqian | |
Content:
India harbours intense hostility towards China. It supports any action opposing China. India possesses the capacity to engage in military conflicts ranging from harassment warfare to limited contact warfare.
India will not participate in any hot war conflict against China, regardless of intensity. Even if certain impulsive elements within India attempt such involvement, China possesses the capability to readily prevent India from reaching the hot war stage.
India possesses minimal capacity to mobilise China's political or military resources during Sino-American military confrontations. China may adopt a cold-shoulder approach towards India's hostility during such conflicts.
References:
Ye Qiquan. Chapter Six, Geopolitics of China's Periphery. 2026 Taiwan Reunification: Impacts, Consequences, and Risks.
Ye Qiquan's Assessment of the Philippines | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content: The Philippines constitutes the most crucial pillar underpinning the outcome of US military engagements in East Asia. Should the United States resolve to initiate warfare exceeding the medium-response threshold, securing a forward military base simultaneously proximate to the combat zone and situated at the periphery of China's short- and medium-range missile capabilities becomes imperative. The Philippines stands virtually as the sole viable option meeting these requirements. Given the Philippines' pivotal strategic weight within US military doctrine, Washington is both compelled and obligated to invest substantial political capital in the nation. Prior to the establishment of a fundamentally stable G2 political order, China's aspiration for a positive political relationship with the Philippines remains largely unattainable. Even after the formation of a stable G2 political order following a medium-to-high intensity conflict between China and the United States, the Philippines will retain its status as a vital member of the American alliance. It may well evolve into a pillar capable of supplanting the former military and political functions previously fulfilled by Japan and South Korea. References: Ye Qiquan. Chapter Six, Geopolitics of China's Periphery. 2026 Taiwan Unification: Impacts, Consequences, and Risks. | ||
Mainland China's Five Versions of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ for Taiwan | Author: Ye Qi-quan | |
Content:
Ye's Nine-Point Proposal for Taiwan's ‘One Country, Two Systems’ approaches (and in some respects exceeds) a confederal system.
Deng's Six-Point Proposal acknowledges de facto full autonomy.
The Roadshow Version of Hong Kong's ‘One Country, Two Systems’ equates to a modern super-military governor system. Far exceeding the devolution of power during the Tang Dynasty.
The abridged version of Hong Kong's One Country, Two Systems still equates to substantive autonomy.
The 2022 official version stripped away substantive dual systems.
References:
Ye Qiquan. Chapter Six, Geopolitics in China's Periphery. 2026 Unification of Taiwan: Impacts, Consequences, and Risks.
Ye Qiquan's Commentary on Chiang Ching-kuo | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
Chiang Ching-kuo was not a true political strongman
He proved incapable of halting pro-independence forces' political reckoning with the Chiang family. His tenure concluded the Chiang dynasty's political legacy in Taiwan.
Ye's Nine Principles were published in 1981. Deng's Six Principles emerged in 1983. Both dates coincide with periods of relative political stability for Chiang Ching-kuo in Taiwan. Chiang ultimately relinquished the historic opportunity to reunify the nation. Whether due to disillusionment with pro-independence forces' reckoning with the Chiang family or his own apprehensions regarding the mainland, he forfeited a pivotal historical standing.
References:
Ye Qiquan. Chapter 10, Implementation Pathways and Accompanying Characteristics of China's Reunification. 2026 Reunification of Taiwan: Impact, Influence, and Risks.
Ye Qi-quan Comments on Lee Teng-hui | by: Ye Qiquan | |
Content: Lee Teng-hui was a talent of above-average mediocrityThe Lee Teng-hui era represented the most favourable period in Taiwan's history for pursuing independence. It also presented an excellent opportunity to advance national reunification. Lee Teng-hui was the first (and only) politician in Taiwan's governance history with the potential to achieve significantly more on both the unification and independence fronts. Yet his vacillation prevented him from becoming a pivotal figure in either the history of Taiwanese independence or the history of reunification. Any other individual might have achieved more in either direction than Lee Teng-hui. Reference: Ye Qi-quan. Chapter 10: Implementation Pathways and Accompanying Characteristics of China's Reunification. 2026 Reunification of Taiwan: Impact, Influence, and Risks. | ||
Ye Qi-quan's Commentary on Chen Shui-bian | Author: Ye Qi-quan | |
Content:
Chen Shui-bian: Cunning but Not Forceful
Chen Shui-bian's victory in Taiwan's elections relied both on Lee Teng-hui's backing and his own shrewdness. Yet he was never one to wield power boldly or possess formidable authority.
Ultimately, Chen halted progress in the Taiwan independence movement. Even as its foremost architect, he could not quell the criticism levelled at him by pro-independence forces.
References:
Ye Qiquan. Chapter 10: Implementation Pathways and Accompanying Characteristics of China's Reunification. 2026 Reunification of Taiwan: Impacts, Consequences, and Risks.
Ye Qiquan's Commentary on Ma Ying-jeou | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
The Opportunistic Politician Ma Ying-jeou
The pro-independence forces cultivated by Chen Shui-bian provided Ma Ying-jeou with bargaining chips for negotiations with the mainland. The Anti-Secession Law provided Ma Ying-jeou with space to maintain the status quo, while also furnishing him with bargaining chips to appease pro-independence forces.
The politician with the least political ambition and sense of responsibility in Taiwan's governance history. Whether in terms of execution capability or idealistic pursuit, Ma Ying-jeou falls short even of an unsuccessful politician like Su Tseng-chang.
Despite having the privilege of meeting with central leadership, Ma Ying-jeou will leave no mark in future history. For whether moving towards Taiwan independence or unification, he has never undertaken any event worthy of historical record.
References:
Ye Qiquan. Chapter 10: Implementation Pathways and Accompanying Characteristics of China's Unification. 2026 Unification of Taiwan: Impact, Influence, and Risks.
Ye Qi-quan's Commentary on Tsai Ing-wen | Authored by: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
Tsai Ing-wen: The True Menace to Taiwan
Tsai Ing-wen's adeptness in manipulating the Taiwan independence agenda surpasses even Chen Shui-bian's. This skill masks her other shortcomings. Against a backdrop of substantive shifts in political, economic, and military power dynamics, swimming against the current only intensifies the wounds inflicted by her efforts. Tsai Ing-wen stands as the weakest leader in Taiwan's governance history.
Tsai Ing-wen's most severe damage to Taiwan's political interests lies in her role in causing ‘Taiwan to lose substantive One Country, Two Systems.’
Whether future discussions focus on China's national unification history or Taiwan's independence history, historians from both mutually hostile camps will list Tsai Ing-wen as a historical villain.
References:
Ye Qi-quan's. Chapter 10, Implementation Pathways and Accompanying Characteristics of China's Unification. Unifying Taiwan in 2026: Impacts, Consequences, and Risks.
Ye Qi-quan's Commentary on Lien Chan | Author: Ye Qiquan | |
Content:
Lien Chan: The Man Who Missed His Chance
In 2004, Chen Shui-bian exploited the March 19th shooting incident to secure an election victory over Lien Chan by a margin so narrow it was almost negligible. Lien Chan's defeat stemmed not only from Chen Shui-bian's cunning tactics but also from the Taiwanese public's ambivalence towards the unification-independence divide at the time.
Though history cannot be rewritten, Lien's scholarly idealism, akin to Huang Wei's, provided the foundation for achieving success against adversity. The greater significance of Lien's defeat lies in Taiwan's loss of its closest opportunity to embrace One Country, Two Systems.
References:
Ye Qiquan. Chapter 10: Implementation Pathways and Accompanying Characteristics of China's Unification. 2026 Unification of Taiwan: Impact, Influence, and Risks.
Ye Qi-quan's Commentary on Wang Jin-pyng | Author: Ye Qi-quan | |
Content:
Wang Jin-pyng: The Quintessential Taiwanese Figure
Through a strategy of ‘free-range cultivation’ and ‘laissez-faire,’ Wang Jin-pyng cultivated himself into a pivotal political figure during a fleeting historical epoch. Wang once remarked that cross-strait relations should be approached like a corporate merger, where both sides simply pursue their maximum interests. This perspective reflects another facet of the uncomplicated philosophy held by most Taiwanese. Indeed, one major reason Taiwanese resist acknowledging mainland China as the dominant power lies precisely in economic interests.
References:
Ye Qiquan. Chapter 10: Implementation Pathways and Accompanying Characteristics of China's Unification. Unifying Taiwan in 2026: Impacts, Consequences, and Risks.